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| 1 | +# Schnorr Signature Specification for Basis Tracker |
| 2 | + |
| 3 | +## Overview |
| 4 | + |
| 5 | +This specification defines the Schnorr signature algorithm implementation for the Basis Tracker system. It follows the chaincash-rs approach with secp256k1 elliptic curve cryptography and is designed to be compatible with Ergo blockchain requirements. |
| 6 | + |
| 7 | +## Signature Format |
| 8 | + |
| 9 | +### Public Keys |
| 10 | +- **Format**: Compressed secp256k1 public keys |
| 11 | +- **Size**: 33 bytes total |
| 12 | +- **Structure**: |
| 13 | + - 1-byte prefix (0x02 or 0x03) indicating compressed format |
| 14 | + - 32-byte x-coordinate of the elliptic curve point |
| 15 | +- **Encoding**: Hexadecimal representation (66 characters) |
| 16 | + |
| 17 | +### Signatures |
| 18 | +- **Format**: 65-byte Schnorr signatures following chaincash-rs format |
| 19 | +- **Size**: 65 bytes total (130 hex characters when encoded) |
| 20 | +- **Structure**: |
| 21 | + - 1-byte prefix (0x02 or 0x03) - compressed public key format indicator |
| 22 | + - 33-byte 'a' component (32-byte random point + 1-byte prefix) |
| 23 | + - 32-byte 'z' component (response value) |
| 24 | +- **Total**: 1 + 33 + 32 = 65 bytes |
| 25 | + |
| 26 | +### Example Signature Breakdown |
| 27 | +For signature `"02f40cf9d43542868b3e97a790872812574a8be92fd02ce229908d578724c28b925fa689420f9be9f5ddb3d22a6b2a317351008ad38fe222f66aae251f04daae03"`: |
| 28 | +- `02`: Prefix (compressed public key format) |
| 29 | +- `f40cf9d43542868b3e97a790872812574a8be92fd02ce229908d578724c28b92`: 'a' component (33 bytes) |
| 30 | +- `5fa689420f9be9f5ddb3d22a6b2a317351008ad38fe222f66aae251f04daae03`: 'z' component (32 bytes) |
| 31 | + |
| 32 | +## Signing Process |
| 33 | + |
| 34 | +### Message Format |
| 35 | +The message to be signed follows the format: `recipient_pubkey || amount_be_bytes || timestamp_be_bytes` |
| 36 | + |
| 37 | +Where: |
| 38 | +- `recipient_pubkey`: 33-byte compressed public key of the recipient (hex-encoded) |
| 39 | +- `amount_be_bytes`: 8-byte big-endian representation of the amount |
| 40 | +- `timestamp_be_bytes`: 8-byte big-endian representation of the Unix timestamp |
| 41 | + |
| 42 | +### Signing Algorithm |
| 43 | +1. **Input Validation**: |
| 44 | + - Verify recipient public key is 33 bytes in compressed format |
| 45 | + - Verify amount and timestamp are valid u64 values |
| 46 | + |
| 47 | +2. **Message Construction**: |
| 48 | + - Concatenate recipient public key bytes (33 bytes) |
| 49 | + - Concatenate amount as 8-byte big-endian (8 bytes) |
| 50 | + - Concatenate timestamp as 8-byte big-endian (8 bytes) |
| 51 | + - Total message length: 49 bytes |
| 52 | + |
| 53 | +3. **Nonce Generation**: |
| 54 | + - Generate a cryptographically secure random nonce `k` (scalar value) |
| 55 | + - Ensure `k` is within the secp256k1 field range |
| 56 | + |
| 57 | +4. **Random Point Calculation**: |
| 58 | + - Compute `R = k * G` where `G` is the secp256k1 generator point |
| 59 | + - Convert `R` to compressed format (33 bytes with 0x02/0x03 prefix) |
| 60 | + - This becomes the 'a' component of the signature |
| 61 | + |
| 62 | +5. **Challenge Computation**: |
| 63 | + - Compute `e = H(R || message || public_key)` using Blake2b512 |
| 64 | + - Reduce `e` modulo the secp256k1 order `n` to get scalar |
| 65 | + |
| 66 | +6. **Response Calculation**: |
| 67 | + - Compute `z = k + e * s (mod n)` where `s` is the private key |
| 68 | + - This becomes the 'z' component of the signature |
| 69 | + |
| 70 | +7. **Signature Assembly**: |
| 71 | + - Combine prefix (from compressed R), 'a' component (R), and 'z' component |
| 72 | + - Total signature: 1 + 33 + 32 = 65 bytes |
| 73 | + |
| 74 | +### Reference Implementation (Pseudocode) |
| 75 | +``` |
| 76 | +function schnorr_sign(message_bytes, private_key_scalar, public_key_bytes): |
| 77 | + // Generate random nonce |
| 78 | + k = random_scalar() |
| 79 | + |
| 80 | + // Calculate random point R = k*G |
| 81 | + R_point = multiply_generator(k) |
| 82 | + R_compressed = compress_point(R_point) // 33 bytes with 0x02/0x03 prefix |
| 83 | + |
| 84 | + // Calculate challenge e = H(R || message || public_key) |
| 85 | + challenge_input = R_compressed || message_bytes || public_key_bytes |
| 86 | + e_full = blake2b512(challenge_input) |
| 87 | + e = reduce_mod_n(e_full) // Reduce to field range |
| 88 | + |
| 89 | + // Calculate response z = k + e*s (mod n) |
| 90 | + z = (k + e * private_key_scalar) % curve_order_n |
| 91 | + |
| 92 | + // Assemble signature: [prefix_byte || R_compressed_without_prefix || z_bytes] |
| 93 | + signature = [R_compressed[0]] || R_compressed[1:] || int_to_bytes(z, 32) |
| 94 | + |
| 95 | + return signature // 65 bytes total |
| 96 | +``` |
| 97 | + |
| 98 | +## Verification Process |
| 99 | + |
| 100 | +### Verification Algorithm |
| 101 | +1. **Signature Parsing**: |
| 102 | + - Extract prefix byte (0x02 or 0x03) |
| 103 | + - Extract 'a' component (33 bytes - compressed point A) |
| 104 | + - Extract 'z' component (32 bytes - response z) |
| 105 | + |
| 106 | +2. **Input Validation**: |
| 107 | + - Verify signature is exactly 65 bytes |
| 108 | + - Verify prefix is 0x02 or 0x03 |
| 109 | + - Verify 'a' component represents a valid point on secp256k1 curve |
| 110 | + - Verify 'z' component is within field range |
| 111 | + |
| 112 | +3. **Challenge Recomputation**: |
| 113 | + - Compute `e = H(A || message || public_key)` using Blake2b512 |
| 114 | + - Reduce `e` modulo the secp256k1 order `n` |
| 115 | + |
| 116 | +4. **Verification Equation**: |
| 117 | + - Verify that `g^z = A * x^e` where: |
| 118 | + - `g` is the secp256k1 generator point |
| 119 | + - `z` is the response from signature |
| 120 | + - `A` is the random point from signature |
| 121 | + - `x` is the public key point |
| 122 | + - `e` is the challenge |
| 123 | + |
| 124 | +5. **Alternative Verification**: |
| 125 | + - Compute `R_check = z*G - e*X` where `X` is the public key point |
| 126 | + - Verify that `compress_point(R_check)` equals the 'a' component from signature |
| 127 | + |
| 128 | +### Reference Implementation (Pseudocode) |
| 129 | +``` |
| 130 | +function schnorr_verify(signature, message_bytes, public_key_bytes): |
| 131 | + if len(signature) != 65: |
| 132 | + return false |
| 133 | + |
| 134 | + prefix = signature[0] |
| 135 | + a_component = signature[1:34] // 33 bytes |
| 136 | + z_component = signature[34:66] // 32 bytes |
| 137 | + |
| 138 | + // Validate prefix |
| 139 | + if prefix != 0x02 and prefix != 0x03: |
| 140 | + return false |
| 141 | + |
| 142 | + // Parse z as scalar |
| 143 | + z = bytes_to_scalar(z_component) |
| 144 | + |
| 145 | + // Parse A (the 'a' component) as a point |
| 146 | + A_bytes = [prefix] + a_component[1:] // Reconstruct with prefix |
| 147 | + A_point = decompress_point(A_bytes) |
| 148 | + if A_point is invalid: |
| 149 | + return false |
| 150 | + |
| 151 | + // Parse public key |
| 152 | + X_point = decompress_point(public_key_bytes) |
| 153 | + if X_point is invalid: |
| 154 | + return false |
| 155 | + |
| 156 | + // Recompute challenge |
| 157 | + challenge_input = A_bytes || message_bytes || public_key_bytes |
| 158 | + e_full = blake2b512(challenge_input) |
| 159 | + e = reduce_mod_n(e_full) |
| 160 | + |
| 161 | + // Verify g^z = A * x^e by checking if z*G = A + e*X |
| 162 | + left_side = multiply_generator(z) |
| 163 | + right_side = A_point + multiply_point(X_point, e) |
| 164 | + |
| 165 | + return left_side == right_side |
| 166 | +``` |
| 167 | + |
| 168 | +## Cryptographic Primitives |
| 169 | + |
| 170 | +### Hash Function |
| 171 | +- **Algorithm**: Blake2b-512 |
| 172 | +- **Output**: 64-byte hash |
| 173 | +- **Usage**: Challenge computation in Schnorr signature scheme |
| 174 | +- **Security**: Collision resistance, preimage resistance |
| 175 | + |
| 176 | +### Elliptic Curve |
| 177 | +- **Curve**: secp256k1 |
| 178 | +- **Field**: Prime field with p = 2^256 - 2^32 - 977 |
| 179 | +- **Generator**: Standard secp256k1 generator point G |
| 180 | +- **Order**: Curve order n ≈ 2^256 - 4.3×10^67 |
| 181 | + |
| 182 | +### Field Operations |
| 183 | +- **Modular Arithmetic**: Operations modulo the secp256k1 curve order n |
| 184 | +- **Scalar Multiplication**: Efficient point multiplication k*P |
| 185 | +- **Point Addition**: Elliptic curve point addition |
| 186 | + |
| 187 | +## Security Considerations |
| 188 | + |
| 189 | +### Nonce Security |
| 190 | +- Nonces must be cryptographically secure random values |
| 191 | +- Never reuse nonces for different messages |
| 192 | +- Consider deterministic nonce generation (RFC 6979) to prevent nonce reuse attacks |
| 193 | + |
| 194 | +### Side-Channel Resistance |
| 195 | +- Implement constant-time operations where possible |
| 196 | +- Protect against timing attacks during scalar multiplication |
| 197 | +- Secure handling of private key material |
| 198 | + |
| 199 | +### Validation Requirements |
| 200 | +- Always validate public keys are on the correct curve |
| 201 | +- Verify signature components are within proper ranges |
| 202 | +- Reject signatures with invalid point encodings |
| 203 | + |
| 204 | +## API Integration |
| 205 | + |
| 206 | +### Ergo Node API Endpoint |
| 207 | +- **Path**: `/utils/schnorrSign` |
| 208 | +- **Method**: POST |
| 209 | +- **Content-Type**: application/json |
| 210 | +- **Authentication**: API key in header |
| 211 | + |
| 212 | +### Request Format |
| 213 | +```json |
| 214 | +{ |
| 215 | + "address": "String", |
| 216 | + "message": "String" |
| 217 | +} |
| 218 | +``` |
| 219 | + |
| 220 | +### Request Fields |
| 221 | +- `address`: String - The Ergo address (P2PK) for which to generate the signature |
| 222 | +- `message`: String - Hex-encoded message to be signed (arbitrary bytes) |
| 223 | + |
| 224 | +### Response Format (Success) |
| 225 | +```json |
| 226 | +{ |
| 227 | + "signedMessage": "String", |
| 228 | + "signature": "String", |
| 229 | + "publicKey": "String" |
| 230 | +} |
| 231 | +``` |
| 232 | + |
| 233 | +### Response Fields |
| 234 | +- `signedMessage`: String - The original hex-encoded message that was signed |
| 235 | +- `signature`: String - 65-byte Schnorr signature in hex format (130 characters) |
| 236 | +- `publicKey`: String - The public key corresponding to the private key used for signing (33 bytes in hex, 66 characters) |
| 237 | + |
| 238 | +### Error Response |
| 239 | +```json |
| 240 | +{ |
| 241 | + "error": { |
| 242 | + "code": "String", |
| 243 | + "message": "String" |
| 244 | + } |
| 245 | +} |
| 246 | +``` |
| 247 | + |
| 248 | +## Test Vectors |
| 249 | + |
| 250 | +### Example Message Construction |
| 251 | +Given: |
| 252 | +- Recipient pubkey: `02d1b60084a5af8dc3e006802a36dddfd09684eaf90164a5ad978b6e9b97eb328b` (33 bytes) |
| 253 | +- Amount: 1000000000 (0x000000003B9ACA00) |
| 254 | +- Timestamp: 1672531200 (0x63B1A800) |
| 255 | + |
| 256 | +Message bytes: `02d1b60084a5af8dc3e006802a36dddfd09684eaf90164a5ad978b6e9b97eb328b000000003B9ACA000000000063B1A800` |
| 257 | + |
| 258 | +### Expected Signature Format |
| 259 | +- Length: 65 bytes (130 hex characters) |
| 260 | +- Structure: [1-byte prefix][33-byte A component][32-byte z component] |
| 261 | +- Valid prefix: 0x02 or 0x03 |
| 262 | + |
| 263 | +## Compliance Requirements |
| 264 | + |
| 265 | +### Chaincash-rs Compatibility |
| 266 | +- Follow the same signature format as chaincash-rs library |
| 267 | +- Maintain compatibility with existing Basis Tracker implementations |
| 268 | +- Use the same message construction format |
| 269 | + |
| 270 | +### Ergo Blockchain Compatibility |
| 271 | +- Signatures must be verifiable by Ergo's cryptographic primitives |
| 272 | +- Public keys must be in compressed format expected by Ergo |
| 273 | +- Follow Ergo's Schnorr signature verification procedures |
| 274 | + |
| 275 | +## Implementation Guidelines |
| 276 | + |
| 277 | +### Recommended Libraries |
| 278 | +- **secp256k1**: For elliptic curve operations |
| 279 | +- **blake2**: For hash function implementation |
| 280 | +- **libsodium**: For additional cryptographic primitives (optional) |
| 281 | + |
| 282 | +### Performance Considerations |
| 283 | +- Optimize scalar multiplication using precomputed tables |
| 284 | +- Consider batch verification for multiple signatures |
| 285 | +- Efficient point compression/decompression routines |
| 286 | + |
| 287 | +### Error Handling |
| 288 | +- Proper validation of all inputs |
| 289 | +- Clear error messages for invalid signatures |
| 290 | +- Secure handling of cryptographic failures |
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