[crypto] eg100 specific fixes

Signed-off-by: Pascal Nasahl <[email protected]>
(commit is original to earlgrey_1.0.0)

Author: nasahlpa

sw/device/lib/crypto/drivers/BUILD

@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ opentitan_test(
     ),
     deps = [
         ":aes",
+        ":rv_core_ibex",
         "//sw/device/lib/base:macros",
         "//sw/device/lib/base:memory",
         "//sw/device/lib/crypto/impl:status",
@@ -228,6 +229,8 @@ dual_cc_library(
             "//hw/ip/rv_core_ibex/data:rv_core_ibex_c_regs",
             "//sw/device/lib/base:abs_mmio",
             "//sw/device/lib/base:csr",
+        ],
+        shared = [
             "//sw/device/lib/base:hardened",
             "//sw/device/lib/crypto/impl:status",
         ],

sw/device/lib/crypto/drivers/hmac.c

@@ -515,7 +515,7 @@ status_t hmac_hash_sha512(const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len,
 }
 
 status_t hmac_hmac_sha256_cl(const hmac_key_t *key, const uint8_t *msg,
-                          size_t msg_len, uint32_t *tag) {
+                             size_t msg_len, uint32_t *tag) {
   // Always configure the key length as the underlying message block size.
   uint32_t cfg = cfg_get(/*hmac_en=*/true, kDigestLengthSha256, kKeyLength512);
   return oneshot(cfg, key, msg, msg_len, kHmacSha256DigestWords, tag);

sw/device/lib/crypto/drivers/hmac.h

@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ status_t hmac_hash_sha512(const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len, uint32_t *digest);
  */
 OT_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT
 status_t hmac_hmac_sha256_cl(const hmac_key_t *key, const uint8_t *msg,
-                          size_t msg_len, uint32_t *tag);
+                             size_t msg_len, uint32_t *tag);
 
 /**
  * Redundant implementation for a one-shot HMAC-SHA256 hash computation.

sw/device/lib/crypto/impl/hmac.c

@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ otcrypto_status_t otcrypto_hmac(const otcrypto_blinded_key_t *key,
         HARDENED_CHECK_EQ(key->config.security_level,
                           kOtcryptoKeySecurityLevelLow);
         return hmac_hmac_sha256_cl(&hmac_key, input_message.data,
-                                input_message.len, tag.data);
+                                   input_message.len, tag.data);
       } else if (launder32(key->config.security_level) ==
                  kOtcryptoKeySecurityLevelMedium) {
         // Call the HMAC core twice and compare both tags. This serves as a FI
@@ -177,14 +177,15 @@ otcrypto_status_t otcrypto_hmac(const otcrypto_blinded_key_t *key,
         HARDENED_CHECK_EQ(key->config.security_level,
                           kOtcryptoKeySecurityLevelMedium);
         HARDENED_TRY(hmac_hmac_sha256_cl(&hmac_key, input_message.data,
-                                      input_message.len, tag.data));
+                                         input_message.len, tag.data));
         // Second HMAC computation using the HMAC core.
         uint32_t tag_redundant[tag.len];
         hmac_key_t hmac_key_redundant;
         HARDENED_TRY(hmac_key_construct(key, kHmacSha256BlockWords,
                                         &hmac_key_redundant));
-        HARDENED_TRY(hmac_hmac_sha256_cl(&hmac_key_redundant, input_message.data,
-                                      input_message.len, tag_redundant));
+        HARDENED_TRY(hmac_hmac_sha256_cl(&hmac_key_redundant,
+                                         input_message.data, input_message.len,
+                                         tag_redundant));
         // Comparison of both tags.
         HARDENED_CHECK_EQ(
             hardened_memeq(&tag.data[0], &tag_redundant[0], tag.len),
@@ -198,7 +199,7 @@ otcrypto_status_t otcrypto_hmac(const otcrypto_blinded_key_t *key,
                           kOtcryptoKeySecurityLevelHigh);
         // First HMAC computation using the HMAC core.
         HARDENED_TRY(hmac_hmac_sha256_cl(&hmac_key, input_message.data,
-                                      input_message.len, tag.data));
+                                         input_message.len, tag.data));
         // Second HMAC computation without using the HMAC core.
         uint32_t tag_redundant[tag.len];
         hmac_key_t hmac_key_redundant;