Use absolute path for permission management for fs_read #2926
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Problem: users are getting prompted to approve fs_read even though they are reading files under CWD (through relative path). and CWD is already added into allowed path. The root cause is a latent software bug: If an allowed path is in aboslute format, and user is reading the same file in relative format, the file path would not actually match. To fix the issue, I am now converting the relative path of the accessed file to absolute path, and only use absolute path for permission management. I considered an alternative approach which is to add './' to allowed path. This would match all files in CWD through relative path. But The problem with that approach is it would also match file acces like './../../../super-secret' etc which is outside CWD. Another way this latent bug could manifest is if user add an absolute path to deny list, it doesn't actually stop the CLI to access that file through relative path... That issue is also fixed now by converting the accessed file to absolute path.
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I noticed an earlier PR is trying to address the same issue. That PR is a more comprehensive fix than this one. #2820. I think we should just take that one instead. |
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Or we can merge my PR first to fix the CWD issue and I can work with the author of #2820 to get his/her more comprehensive change added. That PR is more comprehensive because:
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mr-lee
reviewed
Sep 19, 2025
| let original_cwd = std::env::current_dir().unwrap(); | ||
| std::env::set_current_dir(temp_path).unwrap(); | ||
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| // all of these files are under CWD through relative path. reading them should be allowed by default |
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you want to test the ~ just in case?
mr-lee
approved these changes
Sep 19, 2025
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discarding this PR in favor of #2933 |
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Problem: users are getting prompted to approve fs_read even though they are reading files under CWD (through relative path). and CWD is already added into allowed path.
The root cause is a latent software bug: If an allowed path is in aboslute format, and user is reading the same file in relative format, the file path would not actually match.
To fix the issue, I am now converting the relative path of the accessed file to absolute path, and only use absolute path for permission management.
I considered an alternative approach which is to add './' to allowed path. This would match all files in CWD through relative path. But The problem with that approach is it would also match file acces like './../../../super-secret' etc which is outside CWD.
Another way this latent bug could manifest is if user add an absolute path to deny list, it doesn't actually stop the CLI to access that file through relative path... That issue is also fixed now by converting the accessed file to absolute path.
By submitting this pull request, I confirm that you can use, modify, copy, and redistribute this contribution, under the terms of your choice.
Tested the change: