Skip to content

Quantum Migration BIP #1895

New issue

Have a question about this project? Sign up for a free GitHub account to open an issue and contact its maintainers and the community.

By clicking “Sign up for GitHub”, you agree to our terms of service and privacy statement. We’ll occasionally send you account related emails.

Already on GitHub? Sign in to your account

Open
wants to merge 4 commits into
base: master
Choose a base branch
from
Open

Quantum Migration BIP #1895

wants to merge 4 commits into from

Conversation

jlopp
Copy link
Contributor

@jlopp jlopp commented Jul 15, 2025

Initial draft of a proposal for how to incentivize migration to post quantum cryptography and safeguard the ecosystem from unnecessary inflation of the circulating supply and the economic turmoil likely to accompany such an event.

Copy link
Contributor

@EthanHeilman EthanHeilman left a comment

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.

Excellent BIP, I like the way you laid out the case here.

| 3 years after BIP-360 implementation.
|-
| B
| At a predetermined block height, nodes reject transactions that rely on ECDSA/Schnorr keys.
Copy link
Contributor

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.

I'd be interested an expanded rationale for the approach of rejecting transactions that rely on ECDSA/Schnorr keys vs freezing quantum vulnerable outputs.

Bitcoin's current signatures (ECDSA/Schnorr) will be a tantalizing target: any UTXO that has ever exposed its public key on-chain (roughly 25 % of all bitcoin) could be stolen by a cryptographically relevant quantum computer.

The approach you propose would definitely prevent more thief long term. What is the delta between this and freezing all quantum vulnerable outputs in terms of vulnerable bitcoins?

Is the mechanism to determine if a transaction is reject, if OP_CHECKSIG appears in the script?

If someone did a Schnorr CHECKSIG and a PQ signature CHECKSIG_ML, would that be rejected? Probably right, that would be the more simple check.

Copy link
Contributor Author

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.

Added more details to say reject any of the checksig opcodes. I suppose the logic could be "reject all checksig opcodes unless there is also a checksig_ml opcode" if we felt like someone might footgun their funds.

Copy link
Contributor

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.

That's a good approach since you can still have Schnorr OP_CHECKSIG tapscripts in tapleafs without breaking OP_CHECKSIG_ML tapscripts.

This would break OP_CAT based covenants since they use OP_CHECKSIG in a quantum safe way to verify the txhash of the transaction on the stack. This suggests that if we want OP_CAT, we probably also want OP_PUSH_TXHASH so that people don't use OP_CHECKSIG for covenants.

@deficruncher
Copy link

deficruncher commented Jul 15, 2025

  1. Allow anyone to steal vulnerable coins, benefitting those who reach quantum capability earliest.

"Quantum recovered coins only make everyone else's coins worth less. Think of it as a theft from everyone."

Think of it as a theft from everyone

Not necessarily. Operating quantum computers costs a lot. For example no one will run computations if it costs 100M to break 50M worth UTXO. Of course with technological and algorithmic improvements the cost of breaking a key will go down.

But as costs go down each quantum-computer owner is faced with dillema, they:

  1. either hack the UTXO ASAP pocketing the small difference between value-of-UTXO and cost-to-break-it
  2. or wait for further advancement to increase margin profit

Due to game-theory we can expect quantum-computer-owners to go for option 1. They won't go for option 2, because they don't know if other players will also go for option 2. It introduces race-to-the-bottom dynamics between competing players in which cost-to-break-UTXO approaches value-of-the-UTXO.

Does it seem similar to something? Yeah, bitcoin mining in which average-cost-to-mine-one-bitcoin approaches value-of-one-bitcoin.

Quantum UTXO hacking can be framed as another parallel process of proof-of-work mining, but with the quantum-computers instead of SHA hashing chips. And as such I don't think it is something to deem negative.

@shocknet-justin
Copy link

incentivize migration

If the threat were real (super-positional whether it is or not), that is the incentive.

Forced movement is a non-starter, ones desire to quantum-proof their key does not impart a responsibility on anyone else.

@jlopp
Copy link
Contributor Author

jlopp commented Jul 15, 2025

No one can be forced to move their coins to quantum safe signature schemes.

On the flip side, no one can be forced to accept coins from quantum vulnerable signature schemes.

Copy link
Contributor

@murchandamus murchandamus left a comment

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.

Thanks, this looks great for a first showing. There are a few minor editorial details I noticed, and one aspect regarding BIP 360 (which I see that Ethan also pointed out).


If true, the corollary is:

"Quantum recovered coins only make everyone else's coins worth less. Think of it as a theft from everyone."
Copy link

@deficruncher deficruncher Jul 16, 2025

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.

Quantum recovered coins only make everyone else's coins worth less. Think of it as a theft from everyone.

This is an opinionated framing of the situation. I believe I provided another framing of it as "additional proof-of-work mining along SHA-pow-mining" (see #1895 (comment) ).

I suggest we keep the BIP as neutral as possible without inserting arbitrary framing that conveys some specific opinion whether something is positive or negative.

Copy link
Contributor

@murchandamus murchandamus Jul 16, 2025

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.

That framing is unfounded, because miners are paid to publish updates to Bitcoin’s blockchain, while there is no direct benefit to the Bitcoin ecosystem to incentivize quantum computer development by allowing quantum computer operators to misappropriate funds.

@shocknet-justin
Copy link

On the flip side, no one can be forced to accept coins from quantum vulnerable signature schemes.

If you receive abandoned coins that you suspect were stolen by QC, you can burn them. No one is forced to honor them.

You're not afraid people will be forced to accept coins, but that they will happily accept them. This undermines your previous argument.

This is not a technical BIP, it's a vanity one trying to impose a view on the market.

secure the value of the UTXO set

A functional QC would effectively be a winner-take-all coins, candidates in the running to have it already have access to a material number of coins (Google, Microsoft have countless passwords emails 2FA to custodial platforms and password managers containing seeds, backdoored OS's, softkeyboards... etc).

A QC could also sign for any software distribution as it could bitcoin keys, enabling untold new backdoors into systems. There's no change to Bitcoin that can protect Bitcoin from a QC threat (hoax) because Bitcoin is not the only link in the chain.

@pldallairedemers
Copy link

  1. Allow anyone to steal vulnerable coins, benefitting those who reach quantum capability earliest.

"Quantum recovered coins only make everyone else's coins worth less. Think of it as a theft from everyone."

Think of it as a theft from everyone

Not necessarily. Operating quantum computers costs a lot. For example no one will run computations if it costs 100M to break 50M worth UTXO. Of course with technological and algorithmic improvements the cost of breaking a key will go down.

But as costs go down each quantum-computer owner is faced with dillema, they:

  1. either hack the UTXO ASAP pocketing the small difference between value-of-UTXO and cost-to-break-it
  2. or wait for further advancement to increase margin profit

Due to game-theory we can expect quantum-computer-owners to go for option 1. They won't go for option 2, because they don't know if other players will also go for option 2. It introduces race-to-the-bottom dynamics between competing players in which cost-to-break-UTXO approaches value-of-the-UTXO.

Does it seem similar to something? Yeah, bitcoin mining in which average-cost-to-mine-one-bitcoin approaches value-of-one-bitcoin.

Quantum UTXO hacking can be framed as another parallel process of proof-of-work mining, but with the quantum-computers instead of SHA hashing chips. And as such I don't think it is something to deem negative.

Quantum sweeping does not generate consensus, it only funds quantum. Quantum computing isn't bad in itself, it will advance material science far beyond what can be done with classical supercomputers. But it's a mess for everyone if it ends up crashing crypto in the process, so it's better to close as much of the surface of attack as possible to make sure we don't end up with wicked incentives.

@pldallairedemers
Copy link

On the flip side, no one can be forced to accept coins from quantum vulnerable signature schemes.

If you receive abandoned coins that you suspect were stolen by QC, you can burn them. No one is forced to honor them.

There is no way to know, those transactions are indistinguishable from legit ones, the attacker is literally signing with your private key.

You're not afraid people will be forced to accept coins, but that they will happily accept them. This undermines your previous argument.

This is not a technical BIP, it's a vanity one trying to impose a view on the market.

secure the value of the UTXO set

A functional QC would effectively be a winner-take-all coins, candidates in the running to have it already have access to a material number of coins (Google, Microsoft have countless passwords emails 2FA to custodial platforms and password managers containing seeds, backdoored OS's, softkeyboards... etc).

A functional CRQC will be expensive ($1B-$10B) and only break a finite number of keys per year, it's not infinitely powerful which means that their use will be driven by incentives. The Bitcoin community must decide if they want to be the exit liquidity of quantum computing companies. This BIP proposes a way to reduce the surface of attack as much as possible.

A QC could also sign for any software distribution as it could bitcoin keys, enabling untold new backdoors into systems. There's no change to Bitcoin that can protect Bitcoin from a QC threat (hoax) because Bitcoin is not the only link in the chain.

A lot of links in the chain have started upgrading.
38% of HTTPS traffic is already using PQC encryption on CloudFlare:
https://radar.cloudflare.com/adoption-and-usage#post-quantum-encryption-adoption
Kyber has been supported by Chrome since 2023.
Software signing must still be upgraded on Github.
Banks are roadmapping their own upgrade: https://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap158.htm
Bitcoin is one of the easiest and most profitable target but one of the most difficult to upgrade because of its decentralized nature. While upgrading to stronger signatures, the community must decide what to do with the lost coins.

@Mika001i
Copy link

Mika001i commented Jul 18, 2025

I read about your BIP on CoinDesk. It's mind-blowing and thank you for leading the way. Post-quantum migration should be pro-active rather than reactive.

1BitcoinBoWP1FZ4xwTNkq6XksKidmgYYw

This comment was marked as off-topic.

@bitcoin bitcoin deleted a comment from jlopp Jul 19, 2025
@bitcoin bitcoin deleted a comment from shocknet-justin Jul 19, 2025
@bitcoin bitcoin deleted a comment from shocknet-justin Jul 19, 2025
@jonatack
Copy link
Member

Please keep the comments focused on technical review -- thank you.

Copy link

@1BitcoinBoWP1FZ4xwTNkq6XksKidmgYYw 1BitcoinBoWP1FZ4xwTNkq6XksKidmgYYw left a comment

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.

'''Phase A''': Disallows sending of any funds to quantum-vulnerable locking scripts…

'''Phase B''': Renders ECDSA/Schnorr spends invalid, preventing all spending of funds in quantum-vulnerable UTXOs.

This BIP is hostile for the Bitcoin community and the entire Bitcoin network because it is saying that you can't spend in the future non-quantum compatible funds.

I think @jlopp also need a disclamer, see: https://qb.tc/team

@jlopp
Copy link
Contributor Author

jlopp commented Jul 19, 2025

This BIP is hostile for the Bitcoin community and the entire Bitcoin network because it is saying that you can't spend in the future non-quantum compatible funds.

Simultaneously, this BIP is hostile for quantum capable adversaries because it is saying that you can't steal bitcoin with your fancy computer.

I think @jlopp also need a disclamer, see: https://qb.tc/team

When I wrote my initial essay 4 months ago I was not collaborating with anyone. This BIP is a continuation of those same ideas I came up with independently.

@scottwalker99
Copy link

scottwalker99 commented Jul 19, 2025

This BIP is hostile for the Bitcoin community and the entire Bitcoin network because it is saying that you can't spend in the future non-quantum compatible funds.

I think @jlopp also need a disclamer, see: https://qb.tc/team

NOTE: As a miner starting in November of 2013 who has invested more into the ecosystem than most... When I invested in the QBTC team (Great team all Bitcoiners by the way) it was because we agreed with Lopp essay and we reached out to collaborate. Q-day is coming sir and Lopp proposal is the best I have seen and should be supported.

@1BitcoinBoWP1FZ4xwTNkq6XksKidmgYYw
Copy link

1BitcoinBoWP1FZ4xwTNkq6XksKidmgYYw commented Jul 19, 2025

Openly saying that we can't spend in the future non-quantum compatible funds, is hostile for the Bitcoin community and the Bitcoin network!

If I have Bitcoin from 2011, I will not able to spend it in the future or receive Bitcoin to my address?

@jonatack
Copy link
Member

I've attempted to remove the ad hominem and replies to it. @1BitcoinBoWP1FZ4xwTNkq6XksKidmgYYw, there's no need to repeat the same argument.

Let's keep discussion here focused on technical review of the BIP itself.

@1BitcoinBoWP1FZ4xwTNkq6XksKidmgYYw

@jonatack he proposed nothing technical in nature. He just want us to not able to spend our Bitcoins in the future. I find not a single technical proposal in this BIP draft.

@bitcoin bitcoin deleted a comment from shocknet-justin Jul 19, 2025
@jlopp
Copy link
Contributor Author

jlopp commented Jul 20, 2025

@jonatack he proposed nothing technical in nature. He just want us to not able to spend our Bitcoins in the future.

False. In the event that quantum computers become a reasonable threat, I want people not to be able to spend their coins in a manner that is indistinguishable from quantum theft. As such, I want spending restricted so that it requires a quantum safe cryptographic proof accompanying it.

@1BitcoinBoWP1FZ4xwTNkq6XksKidmgYYw
Copy link

1BitcoinBoWP1FZ4xwTNkq6XksKidmgYYw commented Jul 20, 2025

You don't have to restrict any spending! That is just absurd. You should instead just propose hybrid addresses that are quantum resistant and also backwards compatible with ECDSA.

I also don't understand what is this rush. You seem like someone who very much would like to enforce on us the "spending restriction".

Quantum computers would need ≥ 1 million physical qubits and this must be logical qubits (error-corrected). We are very-very far from any quantum computer that would pose a threat to Bitcoin.

Estimates suggest this kind of quantum computers would exist after the year of 2040. So don't need to rush and block transactions now just because you're afraid of imaginary quantum computers.

@jlopp
Copy link
Contributor Author

jlopp commented Jul 20, 2025

You don't have to restrict any spending! That is just absurd. You should instead just propose hybrid addresses that are quantum resistant and also backwards compatible with ECDSA.

This BIP has no intention of addressing the separate issue of what post quantum cryptographic scheme to implement.

I also don't understand what is this rush. You seem like someone who very much would like to enforce on us the "spending restriction".

This BIP has no intention of addressing the separate issue of when to implement a post quantum cryptographic scheme.

This BIP only addresses the migration and incentives issues that arrive AFTER those questions have been resolved.

In short, it sounds like you have not comprehended the actual timeline and preconditions of activating this BIP.

@1BitcoinBoWP1FZ4xwTNkq6XksKidmgYYw

This comment was marked as off-topic.

@jlopp
Copy link
Contributor Author

jlopp commented Jul 20, 2025

You're free to propose a BIP to compete with BIP-360 and then we'd evaluate how it would affect the need for this BIP.

@1BitcoinBoWP1FZ4xwTNkq6XksKidmgYYw

I strongly consider it.

@1BitcoinBoWP1FZ4xwTNkq6XksKidmgYYw
Copy link

1BitcoinBoWP1FZ4xwTNkq6XksKidmgYYw commented Jul 20, 2025

@jlopp
Here is our BIP titled: Quantum-Resistant Transition Framework for Bitcoin
https://github.com/bitcoin-foundation/bips/blob/master/bip-quantum-resistant-transition-framework-for-bitcoin.mediawiki

Will send it now to the mailing list before opening a new PR.

@1BitcoinBoWP1FZ4xwTNkq6XksKidmgYYw

@jlopp
Feel free to review or use the linked BIP instead of your current version.

The mailing list is not showing our email, even though we’re members of the group.

Would it be acceptable to proceed with a PR directly, or is mailing list discussion still required?

@jlopp
Copy link
Contributor Author

jlopp commented Jul 21, 2025

Let me see if I've got this straight.

After a multitude of comments claiming that restricting spending and freezing funds is absolutely unconscionable and unnecessary because there are other solutions, your proposal is effectively a slightly modified rewrite of my proposal that still restricts spending and ultimately freezes funds?

Whatever happened to

You don't have to restrict any spending! That is just absurd. You should instead just propose hybrid addresses that are quantum resistant and also backwards compatible with ECDSA.

I struggle to justify spending any more time on this conversation as I simply can't take it seriously.

@1BitcoinBoWP1FZ4xwTNkq6XksKidmgYYw
Copy link

1BitcoinBoWP1FZ4xwTNkq6XksKidmgYYw commented Jul 21, 2025

There is a significant difference between your BIP and our BIP.

Your BIP proposal states:

Phase A: Disallows sending of any funds to quantum-vulnerable locking scripts...

In contrast, our BIP allows the spending of classical UTXOs for up to 8 years after activation. (After the first 5 years, users receive error prompts when sending from classical UTXOs, but the funds remain spendable.)

In other words, you propose to immediately block all spending/receiving from classical UTXOs upon activation—which is an unreasonable approach.

@murchandamus
Copy link
Contributor

murchandamus commented Jul 21, 2025

@1BitcoinBoWP1FZ4xwTNkq6XksKidmgYYw: Thank you for taking the time to compile your own variant of @jlopp’s proposal. It appears to have helped you better understand the approach taken in this proposal. Skimming your draft, the main difference appears to be a slightly altered timeline, as your proposal aims to start restricting spending of non-PQ output types after eight years from an undetermined time zero, and @jlopp’s proposal proposes to do so 3 years after PQ signatures have been deployed without guessing at the timeline for this prior work. Discussing the timeline of this proposal and making alternative suggestions is well within the scope of review for this proposal, so it is unclear what benefit opening a duplicate proposal would provide at this time.

As the Bitcoin Developer mailing list is moderated, it might take a moment for your email to go through. Please feel free to open a pull request, if the discussion on the mailing list results in an evolution of your proposal that significantly differs from this proposal to a point where other mailing list participants encourage you to put it up for consideration separately.

@bitcoin bitcoin deleted a comment from sumansuhag Jul 22, 2025
@bitcoin bitcoin deleted a comment from sumansuhag Jul 22, 2025
@pldallairedemers
Copy link

You don't have to restrict any spending! That is just absurd. You should instead just propose hybrid addresses that are quantum resistant and also backwards compatible with ECDSA.

I also don't understand what is this rush. You seem like someone who very much would like to enforce on us the "spending restriction".

Quantum computers would need ≥ 1 million physical qubits and this must be logical qubits (error-corrected). We are very-very far from any quantum computer that would pose a threat to Bitcoin.

This is word salad, the point of distinguishing physical qubits from the logical ones is that they are not the same. It takes 2500 logical qubits to break 256-bit ECDLP, this translates in about 40k to 900k physical qubits. All roadmaps hit that milestone around 2029-2031.

Estimates suggest this kind of quantum computers would exist after the year of 2040. So don't need to rush and block transactions now just because you're afraid of imaginary quantum computers.

You're making up numbers, this is worthless.

@pldallairedemers

This comment was marked as off-topic.

@1BitcoinBoWP1FZ4xwTNkq6XksKidmgYYw

This comment was marked as off-topic.

@murchandamus
Copy link
Contributor

@1BitcoinBoWP1FZ4xwTNkq6XksKidmgYYw and @pldallairedemers: The scheme you are discussing is orthogonal to this proposal. In this PR, please focus on technical review of the document proposed here.

@1BitcoinBoWP1FZ4xwTNkq6XksKidmgYYw

This comment was marked as off-topic.

@murchandamus
Copy link
Contributor

Banned @1BitcoinBoWP1FZ4xwTNkq6XksKidmgYYw for 7 days for continuing to be off-topic after warning.

In this PR, please contribute technical review for this proposal. Whether the proposal should be adopted by the community is a separate conversation that is not on-topic here.

Sign up for free to join this conversation on GitHub. Already have an account? Sign in to comment
Labels
Projects
None yet
Development

Successfully merging this pull request may close these issues.

10 participants