Fix OOB read from unterminated player names in save/network data

[romanstingler]

Replaces unbounded string operations with explicitly bounded std::string_view construction, following the security audit finding in SECURITY_AUDIT.md (section D).

Possible with a crafted save file or malicious network packet

PlayerPack::pName and PlayerNetPack::pName are char[32] fields populated via memcpy from raw save archives or network data. If a crafted save file (or malicious peer in multiplayer) fills all 32 bytes with non-null characters, the name has no null terminator within the buffer.

pfile.cpp:706 used strcpy(hero_names[i], pkplr.pName), which scans indefinitely for a null byte, causing an out-of-bounds read on the source and a potential out-of-bounds write past the 32-byte destination.

pack.cpp:370 and pack.cpp:468 (UnPackPlayer, UnPackNetPlayer) passed packed.pName to CopyUtf8, which accepts a std::string_view. The implicit char[32] → std::string_view conversion calls strlen() internally, triggering the same unbounded scan before CopyUtf8 ever executes.

[qndel]

Replaces unbounded string operations with explicitly bounded std::string_view construction, following the security audit finding in SECURITY_AUDIT.md (section D).

What