chore: modernization sweep — SLSA attestations, SHA-pinned actions, ruff S/B/ASYNC, coverage gate, governance#26
Merged
Conversation
…uff S/B/ASYNC, coverage gate, governance
Implements P1+P2 items from the 2026-05-21 modernization audit. P0 was
empty (no active CVEs, no leaked secrets).
CI/CD
- cd.yml: add actions/attest-build-provenance@v3 (SLSA build provenance,
sigstore-signed wheel/sdist; surfaces on PyPI as 'Build attestations:
verified'). Add `attestations: write` permission. Pass `attestations: true`
to pypa/gh-action-pypi-publish.
- codeql.yml: add `actions` language to the analysis matrix so workflow
files are scanned alongside python sources.
- ci.yml: pytest now runs with coverage (--cov-fail-under=70 enforced via
pyproject addopts; matches measured 71% baseline).
Supply chain
- SHA-pin third-party actions with `# vX.Y.Z` legibility comments:
softprops/action-gh-release@v3.0.0, actions/stale@v10.2.0,
actions/github-script@v9.0.0, actions/attest-build-provenance@v3.2.0.
- First-party actions/* + github/codeql-action/* + pypa/* keep tag pinning
per publisher guidance.
Language/runtime
- pyproject.toml: dev deps now have major bounds (ruff>=0.15,<1, mypy>=2,<3,
pytest>=8,<10, pytest-asyncio>=1,<2). Prevents surprise breaking releases.
- Add pytest-cov>=6,<8 and [tool.coverage] config.
- Extend ruff rule set: B (bugbear), S (bandit subset), ASYNC, RUF, SIM —
with per-file-ignore S101 for tests/ (pytest's primary API is assert).
- server.py: replace EN DASH with hyphen-minus in `greet` field description
(ruff RUF001 fix).
Governance
- Add .github/CODEOWNERS (solo-dev auto-assign).
- Add .github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/{bug_report,feature_request,config}.yml with
scope checks aimed at template clones.
- Add .github/PULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE.md.
- Add .python-version (3.13) for pyenv/uv users.
Security docs
- SECURITY.md: document the full feature set including the GitHub repo-side
toggles that are now enabled (secret scanning + push protection + Dependabot
security updates + branch protection on main). Link to private vuln reporting.
- CHANGELOG.md: clarify [Unreleased] is informational; canonical log is
GitHub Releases auto-notes.
GitHub repo-side toggles (applied via gh api, not in this diff):
- secret_scanning: enabled
- secret_scanning_push_protection: enabled
- dependabot_security_updates: enabled
- vulnerability_alerts: enabled
- branch protection on main: required checks = security, licenses,
test (3.11/3.12/3.13); no PR review requirement; admin override allowed
- allow_auto_merge: true; delete_branch_on_merge: true
Local CI green: ruff (with new rules) clean, ruff format clean,
mypy strict clean, pytest 17/17 with 70.64% coverage.
|
You are seeing this message because GitHub Code Scanning has recently been set up for this repository, or this pull request contains the workflow file for the Code Scanning tool. What Enabling Code Scanning Means:
For more information about GitHub Code Scanning, check out the documentation. |
This was referenced May 20, 2026
heznpc
added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
May 21, 2026
Adversarial second-pass on commits 01ed305 (PR #26) and ec7045d (PR #27), both reported as "done / tests pass / CI green". Two Critical findings. [C1] CodeQL `analyze (actions)` open alert - Rule: `actions/missing-workflow-permissions` - File: .github/workflows/cd.yml - Message: "Actions job or workflow does not limit the permissions of the GITHUB_TOKEN." - Detected by the CodeQL `actions` language matrix that PR #26 itself added. PR #26 introduced top-level permissions on most workflows but missed cd.yml and setup.yml. The 5 required CI checks didn't include CodeQL, so the alert landed silently after merge. - Fix: add `permissions: contents: read` at workflow top level in cd.yml and setup.yml. Jobs continue to opt into the writes they need (contents:write / id-token:write / attestations:write for publish; issues:write for setup). [C2] `ok()` and `err()` Response Helpers — dead code marketed as feature - server.py:41 and server.py:47 defined ok() / err() helpers. - Zero references anywhere in src/ or tests/ (`grep -rn "\\bok(\\|\\berr("` = only the definitions + the introductory comment). - Coverage report confirmed: server.py:43-44, 49 uncovered. - README.md:32 and README.ko.md:30 marketed these as "Response Helpers — ok() and err() for consistent tool responses" in the "What You Get" list — i.e. a public feature claim with no backing code usage. - The bundled `greet` tool returns plain `str` — the README's marketed pattern doesn't match the bundled example. - FastMCP's idiom is `return value` / `raise on error`; ok/err helpers are a raw-MCP-without-FastMCP relic that actively teach the wrong pattern. - Fix: delete ok() / err() / their introductory comment. Replace the Tools-section banner comment with one line documenting the actual FastMCP idiom. Remove the "Response Helpers" bullet from README.md and README.ko.md. Why this matters beyond cosmetics: a starter is a teaching artifact. False "What You Get" entries silently propagate the wrong pattern to every clone. The dead helpers were also reachable code surface that CodeQL has to scan but no test exercises. Verification - All 7 workflows now have top-level `permissions:` (verified via `awk` scan of column-1 `permissions:` line). - ruff / ruff format / mypy strict / pytest 17/17 all clean. - Coverage 72.12% (improved from 70.64% — uncovered dead code removed). Out-of-scope for this PR (will be raised as Major findings for user decision): - tests/test_tools.py has no `test_greet_registered_on_server` despite test_server_info.py and test_code_review.py both having that pattern. - server_info.py wheel-install fallback path (lines 41-42, 52-56) is 0% covered; test only exercises the dev/source-tree read-pyproject path. - src/my_mcp_server/tools/greet.py defines a `register()` that's never called by server.py — fully dead modular example. - SECURITY.md "branch protection on main" claim is starter-side only; clones inherit nothing. - 4 Dependabot PRs (#28, #29, #30, #31) opened today — #28 is attest-build-provenance v3.2.0 → v4.1.0, making our 6-hour-old SHA pin already one major behind.
This file contains hidden or bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
Sign up for free
to join this conversation on GitHub.
Already have an account?
Sign in to comment
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.This suggestion is invalid because no changes were made to the code.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is closed.Suggestions cannot be applied while viewing a subset of changes.Only one suggestion per line can be applied in a batch.Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.Applying suggestions on deleted lines is not supported.You must change the existing code in this line in order to create a valid suggestion.Outdated suggestions cannot be applied.This suggestion has been applied or marked resolved.Suggestions cannot be applied from pending reviews.Suggestions cannot be applied on multi-line comments.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is queued to merge.Suggestion cannot be applied right now. Please check back later.
Summary
Implements P1+P2 items from the 2026-05-21 modernization audit. P0 was empty (no active CVEs, no leaked secrets).
CI/CD
cd.yml: addactions/attest-build-provenance@v3step → SLSA build provenance attestation (sigstore-signed wheel/sdist; surfaces on PyPI as "Build attestations: verified"). Addattestations: writepermission. Passattestations: truetopypa/gh-action-pypi-publish.codeql.yml: addactionslanguage to analysis matrix → workflow files scanned alongside python source.ci.yml: pytest now runs with coverage;--cov-fail-under=70enforced via pyproject addopts (matches measured 71% baseline).Supply chain
SHA-pinned third-party actions with
# vX.Y.Zlegibility comments:softprops/action-gh-releaseb4309332...actions/staleb5d41d4e...actions/github-script3a2844b7...actions/attest-build-provenance96278af6...First-party
actions/*,github/codeql-action/*, andpypa/gh-action-pypi-publish@release/v1keep tag pinning per publisher guidance.Language/runtime
ruff>=0.15,<1,mypy>=2,<3,pytest>=8,<10,pytest-asyncio>=1,<2. Surprise majors no longer turn CI red overnight.pytest-cov>=6,<8+[tool.coverage]config.B(bugbear),S(bandit subset),ASYNC,RUF,SIM.tests/per-file-ignore forS101(pytest usesassert).server.py: replace EN DASH with hyphen-minus ingreetfield description (RUF001fix).Governance
.github/CODEOWNERS— solo-dev auto-assign..github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/{bug_report,feature_request,config}.ymlwith scope checks for template clones..github/PULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE.md..python-version(3.13) for pyenv/uv users.Security docs
SECURITY.mddocuments the full feature set + GitHub repo-side toggles. Links to private vuln reporting.CHANGELOG.md: clarify[Unreleased]is informational; canonical log is GitHub Releases auto-notes.GitHub repo-side toggles (already applied; not in this diff)
secret_scanning: enabledsecret_scanning_push_protection: enableddependabot_security_updates: enabledvulnerability_alerts: enabledmain: required checks =security,licenses,test (3.11/3.12/3.13); no PR review requirement; admin override allowedallow_auto_merge: true;delete_branch_on_merge: trueTest plan
ruff check .passes (new rules included)ruff format --check .passesmypy src/passes (strict)pytestpasses 17/17, coverage 70.64% (above threshold)