Habermas

Habermas Ach Europa

so clearly, we want only a notion of a plausible possibility of rational solutions, we don't want to look just at rational solutions (first vs second order). However, you can't just defer this to process; that would be insufficient, and turn full circle. A deliberation is good if it makes rational solutions plausible, and solutions are plausible if they result from good deliberation. Discuss the different operationalizations about this, including DQI. So what we need, is some kind of standard that is not procedural, but also not substantive, but in-between, kinda like Rawls. But we don't have that ideal position (but we might approximate it?)

The question now is: can Q-method, or intersubjective rationality and meta-consensus be this thing, and if so, why.

Need to look in to the whole concourse theory thing

Q Methodology, maybe via its quantum theoretic reading (it's about viewpoints, and there exist no objective statements (like zero energy atom states) outside of it -- that's not soo far from discourse theory. on this see especially Wendy S. Rogers in operating subjectivity; she argues it is and/or can be used as a form of discourse analysis.

FIXME I might have the difference between constructivism and constructionism wrong in my thesis, especially when citing Berger/Luckmann which seem to be the former and Foucault which is the latter. Constructionism may be the social variant.

Write to McCafferys co-author about q, since he is a psychologist and also does quant stuff.

Somehow the stuff that happens during deliberation is actually quite close to some of the stuff that q methodologists rights and that stephenson assumed; it's in expressing and exchanging views vis-a-vis subjects. Both approaches negate that there's stuff "in the braiN" that just need be extracted.